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         NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
____________ 
 
No. 10-3950 
____________ 
 
STEVE A. FREMPONG, 
        Appellant, 
 
v. 
 
NATIONAL CITY BANK OF INDIANA;  
NATIONAL CITY CORPORATION; RALPH ORSINI; 
FIRST FRANKLIN FINANCIAL CORPORATION, 
d/b/a First Franklin Loan Services;  
MERRILL LYNCH BANK & TRUST, FSB; 
MERRILL LYNCH & COMPANY, INC. 
 __________________________________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania 
(D.C. Civ. No. 09-cv-04515) 
District Judge: Honorable C. Darnell Jones, II 
__________________________________ 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
November 17, 2011 
 
Before:  SLOVITER, SMITH and GREENBERG, Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion filed: November 18, 2011) 
____________ 
 
OPINION 
____________ 
 
 
PER CURIAM 
 Appellant Steven Frempong-Atuahene (“Frempong”) filed a civil rights complaint 
in the Philadelphia County Court of Common Pleas in connection with a mortgage loan 
transaction his wife, Agnes Manu, entered into, a loan that later was assigned to 
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defendant National City Bank of Indiana (“the Bank”).  Frempong sought to bring the 
action under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983, 1981, 1985(3) and 1986, based on the Bank‟s 
foreclosure of the property located at 7000 Woodbine Avenue in Philadelphia.  Frempong 
alleged fraudulent misrepresentation and impairment of his property interest, among 
other claims, in violation of his federal constitutional civil rights.  After the state court 
declined to stop a Sheriff‟s sale of the property, the property was sold at a Sheriff‟s sale 
on October 6, 2009.  The state courts later refused to set aside the sale. 
 Meanwhile, on October 1, 2009, the defendants removed the instant civil rights 
action to the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania 
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1441(c).  Frempong sought a remand to state court, 
which the District Court denied.  Frempong then sought to depose corporate designees of 
the Bank, see Fed. R. Civ. Pro. 30(b)(6).  The Bank, in response, filed a motion for a 
protective order, seeking to block any such depositions.  In addition to arguing that the 
litigation was in bad faith and part of a continuing pattern of harassment, the Bank also 
argued that Frempong was never a party to the mortgage, that he was not a co-signor on 
the note, and that he thus lacked standing to litigate a civil rights action in connection 
with the foreclosure. 
Frempong opposed the Bank‟s motion for a protective order, arguing that he had 
an interest in the property as a husband and co-owner.  The Bank replied – and 
documented – that Frempong was not, and never had been, the record owner of the 
property at 7000 Woodbine Avenue.  The Bank asserted that the property, until January 
5, 2010 (the date when the Sheriff‟s Deed was recorded with the Philadelphia Recorder 
of Deeds), was owned exclusively by Agnes Manu, as evidenced by the Deed. 
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On August 19, 2010, the District Court held a hearing, which both Frempong and 
his wife attended.  Although the argument had been scheduled on the Bank‟s motion for a 
protective order, the subject of the hearing quickly turned to the issue of whether 
Frempong could allege an unconstitutional taking in connection with property in which 
he had no legal interest with respect to third parties.  The District Court questioned 
Frempong about the facts he needed to establish in order to have standing, that is, 
whether he was a record owner of the property or whether he had co-signed the mortgage 
note.  Frempong admitted that only his wife‟s name was on the Deed to the property; his 
was not.  In addition, his name was not included on the mortgage note that obliged his 
wife to pay the mortgage on the property.
1
   
Nevertheless, Frempong argued that he had standing to litigate a civil rights action 
based on equitable concerns.  He and Manu have been married for 30 years, and he has 
lived in the property for 20 years.  He argued that the property is “marital property” 
because it was acquired during the marriage, and thus he has a right, arising in equity and 
under Pennsylvania law, to prosecute an action relating to the foreclosure.  Frempong 
also argued that he had made payments on the mortgage, with the full knowledge of the 
Bank.  Counsel for the Bank then called the District Court‟s attention to Frempong‟s 
previous unsuccessful attempt to intervene in his wife‟s civil rights action in connection 
with the foreclosure, and our decision in that matter, Manu v. National City Bank of 
Indiana, 321 Fed. Appx. 173 (3d Cir. 2009).
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1
 Frempong also acknowledged that he is not an attorney. 
2
 After the Bank obtained a foreclosure judgment in state court, Manu brought her own 
civil rights action, 42 U.S.C. § 1983, in federal court to stop the foreclosure, and 
Frempong filed a motion to intervene in that action, Fed. R. Civ. Pro. 24(a)(2).  See 
Manu, 321 Fed. Appx. 173.  The District Court denied Frempong‟s motion to intervene 
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At the conclusion of the hearing, the District Court ruled from the bench that 
Frempong lacked standing to bring a civil rights action in connection with the foreclosure 
of the property located at 7000 Woodbine Avenue.  The court determined that, because 
Frempong was not an owner of the property or co-signor of the mortgage note, he had no 
legal right to the property with respect to actions taken by third parties.  Accordingly, the 
court indicated that it would dismiss the case, and, in an order entered on August 31, 
2010, the court did just that, dismissing the action with prejudice for lack of standing. 
Frempong appeals.  We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  In his brief, 
Frempong contends that the District Court erred in dismissing his case following oral 
argument on a motion for a protective order, and erred in converting the defendants‟ 
motion for a protective order into a motion to dismiss for lack of standing; that he did not 
have a full and fair opportunity to litigate the issue of standing; and that dismissal for lack 
of standing was in error under Pennsylvania law, see Wm. Penn Parking Garage, Inc. v. 
City of Pittsburgh, 346 A.2d 269 (Pa. 1975) (parking operators have standing to 
challenge tax on their patrons); School Sec. Services v. Duquesne City Sch. Dist., 851 
A.2d 1007 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2004) (trial court‟s sua sponte grant of judgment on the 
pleadings deprived contractor of full and fair opportunity to brief and argue dispositive 
issue of standing). 
                                                                                                                                                  
because he was not a party to the mortgage note and he appealed.  We affirmed.  We 
noted that, under Rule 24(a)(2), intervention must be permitted when the movant “„claims 
an interest relating to the property or transaction that is the subject of the action, and is so 
situated that disposing of the action may as a practical matter impair or impede the 
movant‟s ability to protect its interest, unless existing parties adequately represent that 
interest.‟”  Id. at 175 (quoting Fed. R. Civ. Pro. 24(a)(2)).  The record showed that 
Frempong was not a party to the mortgage note, and he had not shown that he had any 
interest sufficient to warrant intervention, see id. at 175-76. 
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 We will affirm.  We exercise plenary review of standing issues, but we review 
findings of the facts underlying the District Court‟s determination of standing for clear 
error.  See Goode v. City of Philadelphia, 539 F.3d 311, 316 (3d Cir. 2008).  Courts are 
obligated to raise the issue of standing sua sponte.  See FOCUS v. Allegheny County 
Court of Common Pleas, 75 F.3d 834, 838 (3d Cir. 1996) (courts have independent 
obligation to ensure that federal jurisdiction is present).  The party invoking federal 
jurisdiction bears the burden of establishing the elements of standing.  See Lujan v. 
Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 561 (1992). 
 In a related context, we have held that, “[w]hen a District Court decides to convert 
a motion to dismiss into a motion for summary judgment, it must provide the parties 
reasonable opportunity to present all material relevant to a summary judgment motion.”  
In re: Rockefeller Center Properties, Inc. Securities Litigation, 184 F.3d 280, 287-88 (3d 
Cir. 1999) (internal quotations removed).  “The parties can take advantage of this 
opportunity only if they have „notice of the conversion.‟”  Id. (quoting Rose v. Bartle, 
871 F.2d 331, 340 (3d Cir. 1989).  Assuming that Frempong thus was entitled to notice 
that his case was subject to dismissal for lack of standing, and an opportunity to respond, 
we conclude that he had the required notice, and was not denied a full and fair 
opportunity to argue the issue of standing.  The issue of standing was raised by the Bank 
as one of the bases for its motion for a protective order.  In his response in opposition to 
the motion, Frempong specifically addressed the issue and denied the Bank‟s allegation 
that he lacked standing.  He also claimed to be the true owner of the property and to have 
brought the civil rights action to protect his property interests.  Moreover, he challenged 
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the Bank to cite authority for its position that his equitable arguments did not establish his 
standing to bring the civil rights action. 
In addition, the District Court‟s order scheduling oral argument directed the parties 
to be “prepared to discuss, inter alia, the specifics of the pending Motion.”  See District 
Court Order, 7/22/10, Docket Entry # 23.  Those “specifics” obviously included the issue 
of standing.  Furthermore, at oral argument, the District Court gave Frempong every 
opportunity to establish facts that would support his claim of a legal interest in the 
property with respect to third parties.  The fact that Frempong could not deny that he was 
never an owner of the property and that he was not a co-signor of the mortgage note, was 
not due to a lack of preparation; rather, it was due to the reality of his arrangement with 
his wife. 
In School Sec. Services, 851 A.2d 1007, which Frempong has cited in his brief, 
the issue of standing was not raised in the defendants‟ motion in limine, but, instead, was 
raised by the court sua sponte during oral argument.  See id. at 1011.  For that reason, the 
state court held that the plaintiff did not have a full and fair opportunity to brief and argue 
the issue of standing.  Here, in contrast, the record shows just the opposite: that the issue 
was raised and fully briefed by both parties prior to oral argument.  Frempong was not 
surprised when standing became the dispositive issue at oral argument, nor was he 
unprepared to address it.  Accordingly, the District Court did not err in deciding the issue 
of standing following oral argument on the motion for a protective order.  Cf. FOCUS, 75 
F.3d at 838 (courts are obligated to raise the issue of standing sua sponte).   
As to the merits of the standing issue, we conclude that the District Court properly 
determined that Frempong lacked standing to bring a civil rights action under section 
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1983 in connection with the property located at 7000 Woodbine Avenue.  “Constitutional 
standing requires (1) injury-in-fact, which is an invasion of a legally protected interest 
that is (a) concrete and particularized, and (b) actual or imminent, not conjectural or 
hypothetical; (2) a causal connection between the injury and the conduct complained of; 
and (3) it must be likely, as opposed to merely speculative, that the injury will be 
redressed by a favorable decision.”  Danvers Motor Co., Inc. v. Ford Motor Co., 432 F.3d 
286, 291 (3d Cir. 2005) (citing Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560-61). 
 As the District Court concluded, Frempong suffered no “injury-in-fact” because he 
had no legally protected interest in the property with respect to third parties.  The record, 
without a doubt, establishes that Frempong has never been an owner of the property, that 
his name is not on the Deed, and that he did not co-sign the mortgage note.  His claim 
that he has been deprived of his constitutional property rights derives from his assertion 
that the property is “marital property,” and that he has lived there with his wife and 
sometimes paid the mortgage, but Frempong has confused the concept of marital property 
subject to equitable distribution in the event of a divorce, with the rights of a third-party 
creditor (here, the Bank) to enforce an obligation incurred by his wife.  Assuming the 
property is marital property, that “status” has legal effect only as between Frempong and 
his wife. 
 Wm. Penn Parking Garage, Inc., 346 A.2d 269, which holds that, to meet the 
standing requirement, a plaintiff‟s interest must be substantial, direct and immediate, see 
id. at 191, does not support Frempong‟s argument for standing even if it was controlling 
authority in this circuit (and it is not).  This is so because Frempong had no direct interest 
in the property or the foreclosure action as a result of the fact that he was not 
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contractually obligated to pay the mortgage.  That Frempong was indirectly affected 
when his wife failed to meet her mortgage obligations does not give him standing to 
bring his own civil rights action under the law that applies here, see Lujan, 504 U.S. at 
560-61, or the state supreme court‟s decision in Wm. Penn Parking Garage, Inc..   
The analysis of the issue of standing, is, as Frempong suggests, different from the 
analysis of the issue of intervention under Rule 24(a)(2), and so our previous decision in 
Manu, 321 Fed. Appx. 173, does not completely control the outcome of this case.  But 
the facts underlying Frempong‟s claim that he has standing to bring his own civil rights 
action, and those that underlie his previous claim of a right to intervene in his wife‟s civil 
rights action, are the same, and thus the result is the same: Frempong is out of court.  He 
may not pursue a civil rights action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 in which he is the named 
plaintiff any more than he may intervene in his wife‟s section 1983 action.  
The District Court, having determined correctly that Frempong had no colorable 
claim to standing, was without authority to do anything other than dismiss Frempong‟s 
civil rights action.  Because Frempong lacks standing, his lack of notice argument with 
respect to the foreclosure action may not be addressed on the merits in this civil rights 
action.  Last, we reject as meritless any assertion by Frempong that the District Court was 
biased. 
 For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the order of the District Court dismissing 
Frempong‟s civil rights action for lack of standing.  
